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Abstract
Detecting test samples drawn sufficiently far away from the training distribution
statistically or adversarially is a fundamental requirement for deploying a good
classifier in many real-world machine learning applications. However, deep neu-
ral networks with the softmax classifier are known to produce highly overconfident
posterior distributions even for such abnormal samples. In this paper, we propose
a simple yet effective method for detecting any abnormal samples, which is appli-
cable to any pre-trained softmax neural classifier. We obtain the class conditional
Gaussian distributions with respect to (low- and upper-level) features of the deep
models under Gaussian discriminant analysis, which result in a confidence score
based on the Mahalanobis distance. While most prior methods have been evalu-
ated for detecting either out-of-distribution or adversarial samples, but not both,
the proposed method achieves the state-of-the-art performances for both cases in
our experiments. Moreover, we found that our proposed method is more robust
in harsh cases, e.g., when the training dataset has noisy labels or small number of
samples. Finally, we show that the proposed method enjoys broader usage by ap-
plying it to class-incremental learning: whenever out-of-distribution samples are
detected, our classification rule can incorporate new classes well without further
training deep models.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved high accuracy on many classification tasks, e.g.,
speech recognition [1], object detection [9] and image classification [12]. However, measuring the
predictive uncertainty still remains a challenging problem [20, 21]. Obtaining well-calibrated pre-
dictive uncertainty is indispensable since it could be useful in many machine learning applications
(e.g., active learning [8] and novelty detection [18]) as well as when deploying DNNs in real-world
systems [2], e.g., self-driving cars and secure authentication system [6, 30].
The predictive uncertainty of DNNs is closely related to the problem of detecting abnormal sam-
ples that are drawn far away from in-distribution (i.e., distribution of training samples) statistically
or adversarially. For detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) samples, recent works have utilized the
confidence from the posterior distribution [13, 21]. For example, Hendrycks & Gimpel [13] pro-
posed the maximum value of posterior distribution from the classifier as a baseline method, and it
is improved by processing the input and output of DNNs [21]. For detecting adversarial samples,
confidence scores were proposed based on density estimators to characterize them in feature spaces
of DNNs [7]. More recently, Ma et al. [22] proposed the local intrinsic dimensionality (LID) and
empirically showed that the characteristics of test samples can be estimated effectively using the
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LID. However, most prior works on this line typically do not evaluate both OOD and adversarial
samples. To best of our knowledge, no universal detector is known to work well on both tasks.
Contribution. In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective method, which is applicable to
any pre-trained softmax neural classifier (without re-training) for detecting abnormal test samples
including OOD and adversarial ones. Our high-level idea is to measure the probability density of test
sample on feature spaces of DNNs utilizing the concept of a “generative” (distance-based) classifier.
Specifically, we assume that pre-trained features can be fitted well by a class-conditional Gaussian
distribution since its posterior distribution can be shown to be equivalent to the softmax classifier
under Gaussian discriminant analysis (see Section 2.1 for our justification). Under this assumption,
we define the confidence score using the Mahalanobis distance with respect to the closest class-
conditional distribution, where its parameters are chosen as empirical class means and tied empirical
covariance of training samples. To the contrary of conventional beliefs, we found that using the
corresponding generative classifier does not sacrifice the softmax classification accuracy. Perhaps
surprisingly, its confidence score outperforms softmax-based ones very strongly across multiple
other tasks: detecting OOD samples, detecting adversarial samples and class-incremental learning.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method using deep convolutional neural networks,
such as DenseNet [14] and ResNet [12] trained for image classification tasks on various datasets
including CIFAR [15], SVHN [28], ImageNet [5] and LSUN [32]. First, for the problem of detecting
OOD samples, the proposed method outperforms the current state-of-the-art method, ODIN [21], in
all tested cases. In particular, compared to ODIN, our method improves the true negative rate (TNR),
i.e., the fraction of detected OOD (e.g., LSUN) samples, from 45.6% to 90.9% on ResNet when
95% of in-distribution (e.g., CIFAR-100) samples are correctly detected. Next, for the problem
of detecting adversarial samples, e.g., generated by four attack methods such as FGSM [10], BIM
[16], DeepFool [26] and CW [3], our method outperforms the state-of-the-art detection measure,
LID [22]. In particular, compared to LID, ours improves the TNR of CW from 82.9% to 95.8% on
ResNet when 95% of normal CIFAR-10 samples are correctly detected.
We also found that our proposed method is more robust in the choice of its hyperparameters as well
as against extreme scenarios, e.g., when the training dataset has some noisy, random labels or a
small number of data samples. In particular, Liang et al. [21] tune the hyperparameters of ODIN
using validation sets of OOD samples, which is often impossible since the knowledge about OOD
samples is not accessible a priori. We show that hyperparameters of the proposed method can be
tuned only using in-distribution (training) samples, while maintaining its performance. We further
show that the proposed method tuned on a simple attack, i.e., FGSM, can be used to detect other
more complex attacks such as BIM, DeepFool and CW.
Finally, we apply our method to class-incremental learning [29]: new classes are added progressively
to a pre-trained classifier. Since the new class samples are drawn from an out-of-training distribution,
it is natural to expect that one can classify them using our proposed metric without re-training the
deep models. Motivated by this, we present a simple method which accommodates a new class at
any time by simply computing the class mean of the new class and updating the tied covariance of all
classes. We show that the proposed method outperforms other baseline methods, such as Euclidean
distance-based classifier and re-trained softmax classifier. This evidences that our approach have a
potential to apply to many other related machine learning tasks, such as active learning [8], ensemble
learning [19] and few-shot learning [31].
2 Mahalanobis distance-based score from generative classifier
Given deep neural networks (DNNs) with the softmax classifier, we propose a simple yet effective
method for detecting abnormal samples such as out-of-distribution (OOD) and adversarial ones. We
first present the proposed confidence score based on an induced generative classifier under Gaussian
discriminant analysis (GDA), and then introduce additional techniques to improve its performance.
We also discuss how the confidence score is applicable to incremental learning.
2.1 Why Mahalanobis distance-based score?
Derivation of generative classifiers from softmax ones. Let x ∈ X be an input and y ∈
Y = {1, · · · , C} be its label. Suppose that a pre-trained softmax neural classifier is given:
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Figure 1: Experimental results under the ResNet with 34 layers. (a) Visualization of final features
from ResNet trained on CIFAR-10 by t-SNE, where the colors of points indicate the classes of the
corresponding objects. (b) Classification test set accuracy of ResNet on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and
SVHN datasets. (c) Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves: the x-axis and y-axis represent
the false positive rate (FPR) and true positive rate (TPR), respectively.
P (y = c|x) = exp(w
>
c f(x)+bc)∑
c′ exp(w>c′f(x)+bc′)
, where wc and bc are the weight and the bias of the soft-
max classifier for class c, and f(·) denotes the output of the penultimate layer of DNNs. Then,
without any modification on the pre-trained softmax neural classifier, we obtain a generative clas-
sifier assuming that a class-conditional distribution follows the multivariate Gaussian distribu-
tion. Specifically, we define C class-conditional Gaussian distributions with a tied covariance Σ:
P (f(x)|y = c) = N (f(x)|µc,Σ) , where µc is the mean of multivariate Gaussian distribution of
class c ∈ {1, ..., C}. Here, our approach is based on a simple theoretical connection between GDA
and the softmax classifier: the posterior distribution defined by the generative classifier under GDA
with tied covariance assumption is equivalent to the softmax classifier (see the supplementary mate-
rial for more details). Therefore, the pre-trained features of the softmax neural classifier f(x) might
also follow the class-conditional Gaussian distribution.
To estimate the parameters of the generative classifier from the pre-trained softmax neural classifier,
we compute the empirical class mean and covariance of training samples {(x1, y1), . . . , (xN , yN )}:
µ̂c =
1
Nc
∑
i:yi=c
f(xi), Σ̂ =
1
N
∑
c
∑
i:yi=c
(f(xi)− µ̂c) (f(xi)− µ̂c)> , (1)
where Nc is the number of training samples with label c. This is equivalent to fitting the class-
conditional Gaussian distributions with a tied covariance to training samples under the maximum
likelihood estimator.
Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score. Using the above induced class-conditional Gaus-
sian distributions, we define the confidence score M(x) using the Mahalanobis distance between
test sample x and the closest class-conditional Gaussian distribution, i.e.,
M(x) = max
c
− (f(x)− µ̂c)> Σ̂−1 (f(x)− µ̂c) . (2)
Note that this metric corresponds to measuring the log of the probability densities of the test sample.
Here, we remark that abnormal samples can be characterized better in the representation space of
DNNs, rather than the “label-overfitted” output space of softmax-based posterior distribution used
in the prior works [13, 21] for detecting them. It is because a confidence measure obtained from the
posterior distribution can show high confidence even for abnormal samples that lie far away from
the softmax decision boundary. Feinman et al. [7] and Ma et al. [22] process the DNN features for
detecting adversarial samples in a sense, but do not utilize the Mahalanobis distance-based metric,
i.e., they only utilize the Euclidean distance in their scores. In this paper, we show that Mahalanobis
distance is significantly more effective than the Euclidean distance in various tasks.
Experimental supports for generative classifiers. To evaluate our hypothesis that trained features
of DNNs support the assumption of GDA, we measure the classification accuracy as follows:
ŷ(x) = arg min
c
(f(x)− µ̂c)> Σ̂−1 (f(x)− µ̂c) . (3)
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Algorithm 1 Computing the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score.
Input: Test sample x, weights of logistic regression detector α`, noise ε and parameters of Gaus-
sian distributions {µ̂`,c, Σ̂` : ∀`, c}
Initialize score vectors: M(x) = [M` : ∀`]
for each layer ` ∈ 1, . . . , L do
Find the closest class: ĉ = arg minc (f`(x)− µ̂`,c)>Σ̂−1` (f`(x)− µ̂`,c)
Add small noise to test sample: x̂ = x− εsign
(
5x (f`(x)− µ̂`,ĉ)> Σ̂−1` (f`(x)− µ̂`,ĉ)
)
Computing confidence score: M` = max
c
− (f`(x̂)− µ̂`,c)> Σ̂−1` (f`(x̂)− µ̂`,c)
end for
return Confidence score for test sample
∑
` α`M`
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Figure 2: AUROC (%) of threshold-based detector using the confidence score in (2) computed at
different basic blocks of DenseNet trained on CIFAR-10 dataset. We measure the detection perfor-
mance using (a) TinyImageNet, (b) LSUN, (c) SVHN and (d) adversarial (DeepFool) samples.
We remark that this corresponds to predicting a class label using the posterior distribution from gen-
erative classifier with the uniform class prior. Interestingly, we found that the softmax accuracy (red
bar) is also achieved by the Mahalanobis distance-based classifier (blue bar), while conventional
knowledge is that a generative classifier trained from scratch typically performs much worse than a
discriminative classifier such as softmax. For visual interpretation, Figure 1(a) presents embeddings
of final features from CIFAR-10 test samples constructed by t-SNE [23], where the colors of points
indicate the classes of the corresponding objects. One can observe that all ten classes are clearly
separated in the embedding space, which supports our intuition. In addition, we also show that
Mahalanobis distance-based metric can be very useful in detecting out-of-distribution samples. For
evaluation, we obtain the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve using a simple threshold-
based detector by computing the confidence score M(x) on a test sample x and decide it as positive
(i.e., in-distribution) if M(x) is above some threshold. The Euclidean distance, which only utilizes
the empirical class means, is considered for comparison. We train ResNet on CIFAR-10, and Tiny-
ImageNet dataset [5] is used for an out-of-distribution. As shown in Figure 1(c), the Mahalanobis
distance-based metric (blue bar) performs better than Euclidean one (green bar) and the maximum
value of the softmax distribution (red bar).
2.2 Calibration techniques
Input pre-processing. To make in- and out-of-distribution samples more separable, we consider
adding a small controlled noise to a test sample. Specifically, for each test sample x, we calculate
the pre-processed sample x̂ by adding the small perturbations as follows:
x̂ = x + εsign (5xM(x)) = x− εsign
(
5x (f(x)− µ̂ĉ)> Σ̂−1 (f(x)− µ̂ĉ)
)
, (4)
where ε is a magnitude of noise and ĉ is the index of the closest class. Next, we measure the confi-
dence score using the pre-processed sample. We remark that the noise is generated to increase the
proposed confidence score (2) unlike adversarial attacks [10]. In our experiments, such perturba-
tion can have stronger effect on separating the in- and out-of-distribution samples. We remark that
similar input pre-processing was studied in [21], where the perturbations are added to increase the
softmax score of the predicted label. However, our method is different in that the noise is generated
to increase the proposed metric.
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Algorithm 2 Updating Mahalanobis distance-based classifier for class-incremental learning.
Input: set of samples from a new class {xi : ∀i = 1 . . . NC+1}, mean and covariance of observed
classes {µ̂c : ∀c = 1 . . . C}, Σ̂
Compute the new class mean: µ̂C+1 ← 1NC+1
∑
i f(xi)
Compute the covariance of the new class: Σ̂C+1 ← 1NC+1
∑
i(f(xi)− µ̂C+1)(f(xi)− µ̂C+1)>
Update the shared covariance: Σ̂← CC+1Σ̂ + 1C+1Σ̂C+1
return Mean and covariance of all classes {µ̂c : ∀c = 1 . . . C + 1}, Σ̂
Feature ensemble. To further improve the performance, we consider measuring and combining the
confidence scores from not only the final features but also the other low-level features in DNNs.
Formally, given training data, we extract the `-th hidden features of DNNs, denoted by f`(x), and
compute their empirical class means and tied covariances, i.e., µ̂`,c and Σ̂`. Then, for each test
sample x, we measure the confidence score from the `-th layer using the formula in (2). One can
expect that this simple but natural scheme can bring an extra gain in obtaining a better calibrated
score by extracting more input-specific information from the low-level features. We measure the
area under ROC (AUROC) curves of the threshold-based detector using the confidence score in
(2) computed at different basic blocks of DenseNet [14] trained on CIFAR-10 dataset, where the
overall trends on ResNet are similar. Figure 2 shows the performance on various OOD samples such
as SVHN [28], LSUN [32], TinyImageNet and adversarial samples generated by DeepFool [26],
where the dimensions of the intermediate features are reduced using average pooling (see Section
3 for more details). As shown in Figure 2, the confidence scores computed at low-level features
often provide better calibrated ones compared to final features (e.g., LSUN, TinyImageNet and
DeepFool). To further improve the performance, we design a feature ensemble method as described
in Algorithm 1. We first extract the confidence scores from all layers, and then integrate them by
weighted averaging:
∑
` α`M`(x), where M`(·) and α` is the confidence score at the `-th layer
and its weight, respectively. In our experiments, following similar strategies in [22], we choose
the weight of each layer α` by training a logistic regression detector using validation samples. We
remark that such weighted averaging of confidence scores can prevent the degradation on the overall
performance even in the case when the confidence scores from some layers are not effective: the
trained weights (using validation) would be nearly zero for those ineffective layers.
2.3 Class-incremental learning using Mahalanobis distance-based score
As a natural extension, we also show that the Mahalanobis distance-based confidence score can be
utilized in class-incremental learning tasks [29]: a classifier pre-trained on base classes is progres-
sively updated whenever a new class with corresponding samples occurs. This task is known to be
challenging since one has to deal with catastrophic forgetting [24] with a limited memory. To this
end, recent works have been toward developing new training methods which involve a generative
model or data sampling, but adopting such training methods might incur expensive back-and-forth
costs. Based on the proposed confidence score, we develop a simple classification method without
the usage of complicated training methods. To do this, we first assume that the classifier is well
pre-trained with a certain amount of base classes, where the assumption is quite reasonable in many
practical scenarios.1 In this case, one can expect that not only the classifier can detect OOD samples
well, but also might be good for discriminating new classes, as the representation learned with the
base classes can characterize new ones. Motivated by this, we present a Mahalanobis distance-based
classifier based on (3), which tries to accommodate a new class by simply computing and updating
the class mean and covariance, as described in Algorithm 2. The class-incremental adaptation of our
confidence score shows its potential to be applied to a wide range of new applications in the future.
1For example, state-of-the-art CNNs trained on large-scale image dataset are off-the-shelf [12, 14], so they
are a starting point in many computer vision tasks [9, 18, 25].
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Method Featureensemble
Input
pre-processing
TNR
at TPR 95% AUROC
Detection
accuracy
AUPR
in
AUPR
out
Baseline [13] - - 32.47 89.88 85.06 85.40 93.96
ODIN [21] - - 86.55 96.65 91.08 92.54 98.52
Mahalanobis
(ours)
- - 54.51 93.92 89.13 91.56 95.95
- X 92.26 98.30 93.72 96.01 99.28
X - 91.45 98.37 93.55 96.43 99.35
X X 96.42 99.14 95.75 98.26 99.60
Table 1: Contribution of each proposed method on distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test
set data. We measure the detection performance using ResNet trained on CIFAR-10, when SVHN
dataset is used as OOD. All values are percentages and the best results are indicated in bold.
3 Experimental results
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method using deep convolutional
neural networks such as DenseNet [14] and ResNet [12] on various vision datasets: CIFAR [15],
SVHN [28], ImageNet [5] and LSUN [32]. Due to the space limitation, we provide the more detailed
experimental setups and results in the supplementary material. Our code is available at https:
//github.com/pokaxpoka/deep_Mahalanobis_detector.
3.1 Detecting out-of-distribution samples
Setup. For the problem of detecting out-of-distribution (OOD) samples, we train DenseNet with 100
layers and ResNet with 34 layers for classifying CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and SVHN datasets. The
dataset used in training is the in-distribution (positive) dataset and the others are considered as OOD
(negative). We only use test datasets for evaluation. In addition, the TinyImageNet (i.e., subset of
ImageNet dataset) and LSUN datasets are also tested as OOD. For evaluation, we use a threshold-
based detector which measures some confidence score of the test sample, and then classifies the
test sample as in-distribution if the confidence score is above some threshold. We measure the
following metrics: the true negative rate (TNR) at 95% true positive rate (TPR), the area under the
receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC), the area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR),
and the detection accuracy. For comparison, we consider the baseline method [13], which defines
a confidence score as a maximum value of the posterior distribution, and the state-of-the-art ODIN
[21], which defines the confidence score as a maximum value of the processed posterior distribution.
For our method, we extract the confidence scores from every end of dense (or residual) block of
DenseNet (or ResNet). The size of feature maps on each convolutional layers is reduced by average
pooling for computational efficiency: F × H ×W → F × 1, where F is the number of channels
and H ×W is the spatial dimension. As shown in Algorithm 1, the output of the logistic regres-
sion detector is used as the final confidence score in our case. All hyperparameters are tuned on a
separate validation set, which consists of 1,000 images from each in- and out-of-distribution pair.
Similar to Ma et al. [22], the weights of logistic regression detector are trained using nested cross
validation within the validation set, where the class label is assigned positive for in-distribution sam-
ples and assigned negative for OOD samples. Since one might not have OOD validation datasets in
practice, we also consider tuning the hyperparameters using in-distribution (positive) samples and
corresponding adversarial (negative) samples generated by FGSM [10].
Contribution by each technique and comparison with ODIN. Table 1 validates the contributions
of our suggested techniques under the comparison with the baseline method and ODIN. We measure
the detection performance using ResNet trained on CIFAR-10, when SVHN dataset is used as OOD.
We incrementally apply our techniques to see the stepwise improvement by each component. One
can note that our method significantly outperforms the baseline method without feature ensembles
and input pre-processing. This implies that our method can characterize the OOD samples very
effectively compared to the posterior distribution. By utilizing the feature ensemble and input pre-
processing, the detection performance are further improved compared to that of ODIN. The left-hand
column of Table 2 reports the detection performance with ODIN for all in- and out-of-distribution
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In-dist
(model) OOD
Validation on OOD samples Validation on adversarial samples
TNR at TPR 95% AUROC Detection acc. TNR at TPR 95% AUROC Detection acc.
Baseline [13] / ODIN [21] / Mahalanobis (ours) Baseline [13] / ODIN [21] / Mahalanobis (ours)
CIFAR-10
(DenseNet)
SVHN 40.2 / 86.2 / 90.8 89.9 / 95.5 / 98.1 83.2 / 91.4 / 93.9 40.2 / 70.5 / 89.6 89.9 / 92.8 / 97.6 83.2 / 86.5 / 92.6
TinyImageNet 58.9 / 92.4 / 95.0 94.1 / 98.5 / 98.8 88.5 / 93.9 / 95.0 58.9 / 87.1 / 94.9 94.1 / 97.2 / 98.8 88.5 / 92.1 / 95.0
LSUN 66.6 / 96.2 / 97.2 95.4 / 99.2 / 99.3 90.3 / 95.7 / 96.3 66.6 / 92.9 / 97.2 95.4 / 98.5 / 99.2 90.3 / 94.3 / 96.2
CIFAR-100
(DenseNet)
SVHN 26.7 / 70.6 / 82.5 82.7 / 93.8 / 97.2 75.6 / 86.6 / 91.5 26.7 / 39.8 / 62.2 82.7 / 88.2 / 91.8 75.6 / 80.7 / 84.6
TinyImageNet 17.6 / 42.6 / 86.6 71.7 / 85.2 / 97.4 65.7 / 77.0 / 92.2 17.6 / 43.2 / 87.2 71.7 / 85.3 / 97.0 65.7 / 77.2 / 91.8
LSUN 16.7 / 41.2 / 91.4 70.8 / 85.5 / 98.0 64.9 / 77.1 / 93.9 16.7 / 42.1 / 91.4 70.8 / 85.7 / 97.9 64.9 / 77.3 / 93.8
SVHN
(DenseNet)
CIFAR-10 69.3 / 71.7 / 96.8 91.9 / 91.4 / 98.9 86.6 / 85.8 / 95.9 69.3 / 69.3 / 97.5 91.9 / 91.9 / 98.8 86.6 / 86.6 / 96.3
TinyImageNet 79.8 / 84.1 / 99.9 94.8 / 95.1 / 99.9 90.2 / 90.4 / 98.9 79.8 / 79.8 / 99.9 94.8 / 94.8 / 99.8 90.2 / 90.2 / 98.9
LSUN 77.1 / 81.1 / 100 94.1 / 94.5 / 99.9 89.1 / 89.2 / 99.3 77.1 / 77.1 / 100 94.1 / 94.1 / 99.9 89.1 / 89.1 / 99.2
CIFAR-10
(ResNet)
SVHN 32.5 / 86.6 / 96.4 89.9 / 96.7 / 99.1 85.1 / 91.1 / 95.8 32.5 / 40.3 / 75.8 89.9 / 86.5 / 95.5 85.1 / 77.8 / 89.1
TinyImageNet 44.7 / 72.5 / 97.1 91.0 / 94.0 / 99.5 85.1 / 86.5 / 96.3 44.7 / 69.6 / 95.5 91.0 / 93.9 / 99.0 85.1 / 86.0 / 95.4
LSUN 45.4 / 73.8 / 98.9 91.0 / 94.1 / 99.7 85.3 / 86.7 / 97.7 45.4 / 70.0 / 98.1 91.0 / 93.7 / 99.5 85.3 / 85.8 / 97.2
CIFAR-100
(ResNet)
SVHN 20.3 / 62.7 / 91.9 79.5 / 93.9 / 98.4 73.2 / 88.0 / 93.7 20.3 / 12.2 / 41.9 79.5 / 72.0 / 84.4 73.2 / 67.7 / 76.5
TinyImageNet 20.4 / 49.2 / 90.9 77.2 / 87.6 / 98.2 70.8 / 80.1 / 93.3 20.4 / 33.5 / 70.3 77.2 / 83.6 / 87.9 70.8 / 75.9 / 84.6
LSUN 18.8 / 45.6 / 90.9 75.8 / 85.6 / 98.2 69.9 / 78.3 / 93.5 18.8 / 31.6 / 56.6 75.8 / 81.9 / 82.3 69.9 / 74.6 / 79.7
SVHN
(ResNet)
CIFAR-10 78.3 / 79.8 / 98.4 92.9 / 92.1 / 99.3 90.0 / 89.4 / 96.9 78.3 / 79.8 / 94.1 92.9 / 92.1 / 97.6 90.0 / 89.4 / 94.6
TinyImageNet 79.0 / 82.1 / 99.9 93.5 / 92.0 / 99.9 90.4 / 89.4 / 99.1 79.0 / 80.5 / 99.2 93.5 / 92.9 / 99.3 90.4 / 90.1 / 98.8
LSUN 74.3 / 77.3 / 99.9 91.6 / 89.4 / 99.9 89.0 / 87.2 / 99.5 74.3 / 76.3 / 99.9 91.6 / 90.7 / 99.9 89.0 / 88.2 / 99.5
Table 2: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification under various
validation setups. All values are percentages and the best results are indicated in bold.
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(b) Training data with random labels
Figure 3: Comparison of AUROC (%) under extreme scenarios: (a) small number of training data,
where the x-axis represents the number of training data. (b) Random label is assigned to training
data, where the x-axis represents the percentage of training data with random label.
dataset pairs. Our method outperforms the baseline and ODIN for all tested cases. In particular,
our method improves the TNR, i.e., the fraction of detected LSUN samples, compared to ODIN:
41.2%→ 91.4% using DenseNet, when 95% of CIFAR-100 samples are correctly detected.
Comparison of robustness. In order to evaluate the robustness of our method, we measure the
detection performance when all hyperparameters are tuned only using in-distribution and adversarial
samples generated by FGSM [10]. As shown in the right-hand column of Table 2, ODIN is working
poorly compared to the baseline method in some cases (e.g., DenseNet trained on SVHN), while our
method still outperforms the baseline and ODIN consistently. We remark that our method validated
without OOD but adversarial samples even outperforms ODIN validated with OOD. We also verify
the robustness of our method under various training setups. Since our method utilizes empirical
class mean and covariance of training samples, there is a caveat such that it can be affected by the
properties of training data. In order to verify the robustness, we measure the detection performance
when we train ResNet by varying the number of training data and assigning random label to training
data on CIFAR-10 dataset. As shown in Figure 3, our method (blue bar) maintains high detection
performances even for small number of training data or noisy one, while baseline (red bar) and ODIN
(yellow bar) do not. Finally, we remark that our method using softmax neural classifier trained by
standard cross entropy loss typically outperforms the ODIN using softmax neural classifier trained
by confidence loss [20] which involves jointly training a generator and a classifier to calibrate the
posterior distribution even though training such model is computationally more expensive (see the
supplementary material for more details).
3.2 Detecting adversarial samples
Setup. For the problem of detecting adversarial samples, we train DenseNet and ResNet for classi-
fying CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and SVHN datasets, and the corresponding test dataset is used as the
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Model Dataset(model) Score
Detection of known attack Detection of unknown attack
FGSM BIM DeepFool CW FGSM (seen) BIM DeepFool CW
DenseNet
CIFAR-10
KD+PU [7] 85.96 96.80 68.05 58.72 85.96 3.10 68.34 53.21
LID [22] 98.20 99.74 85.14 80.05 98.20 94.55 70.86 71.50
Mahalanobis (ours) 99.94 99.78 83.41 87.31 99.94 99.51 83.42 87.95
CIFAR-100
KD+PU [7] 90.13 89.69 68.29 57.51 90.13 66.86 65.30 58.08
LID [22] 99.35 98.17 70.17 73.37 99.35 68.62 69.68 72.36
Mahalanobis (ours) 99.86 99.17 77.57 87.05 99.86 98.27 75.63 86.20
SVHN
KD+PU [7] 86.95 82.06 89.51 85.68 86.95 83.28 84.38 82.94
LID [22] 99.35 94.87 91.79 94.70 99.35 92.21 80.14 85.09
Mahalanobis (ours) 99.85 99.28 95.10 97.03 99.85 99.12 93.47 96.95
ResNet
CIFAR-10
KD+PU [7] 81.21 82.28 81.07 55.93 83.51 16.16 76.80 56.30
LID [22] 99.69 96.28 88.51 82.23 99.69 95.38 71.86 77.53
Mahalanobis (ours) 99.94 99.57 91.57 95.84 99.94 98.91 78.06 93.90
CIFAR-100
KD+PU [7] 89.90 83.67 80.22 77.37 89.90 68.85 57.78 73.72
LID [22] 98.73 96.89 71.95 78.67 98.73 55.82 63.15 75.03
Mahalanobis (ours) 99.77 96.90 85.26 91.77 99.77 96.38 81.95 90.96
SVHN
KD+PU [7] 82.67 66.19 89.71 76.57 82.67 43.21 84.30 67.85
LID [22] 97.86 90.74 92.40 88.24 97.86 84.88 67.28 76.58
Mahalanobis (ours) 99.62 97.15 95.73 92.15 99.62 95.39 72.20 86.73
Table 3: Comparison of AUROC (%) under various validation setups. For evaluation on unknown
attack, FGSM samples denoted by “seen” are used for validation. For our method, we use both
feature ensemble and input pre-processing. The best results are indicated in bold.
positive samples to measure the performance. We use adversarial images as the negative samples
generated by the following attack methods: FGSM [10], BIM [16], DeepFool [26] and CW [3],
where the detailed explanations can be found in the supplementary material. For comparison, we
use a logistic regression detector based on combinations of kernel density (KD) [7] and predictive
uncertainty (PU), i.e., maximum value of posterior distribution. We also compare the state-of-the-
art local intrinsic dimensionality (LID) scores [22]. Following the similar strategies in [7, 22], we
randomly choose 10% of original test samples for training the logistic regression detectors and the
remaining test samples are used for evaluation. Using nested cross-validation within the training set,
all hyper-parameters are tuned.
Comparison with LID and generalization analysis. The left-hand column of Table 3 reports the
AUROC score of a logistic regression detectors for all normal and adversarial pairs. One can note
that the proposed method outperforms all tested methods in most cases. In particular, ours improves
the AUROC of LID from 82.2% to 95.8% when we detect CW samples using ResNet trained on
the CIFAR-10 dataset. Similar to [22], we also evaluate whether the proposed method is tuned on
a simple attack can be generalized to detect other more complex attacks. To this end, we measure
the detection performance when we train the logistic regression detector using samples generated by
FGSM. As shown in the right-hand column of Table 3, our method trained on FGSM can accurately
detect much more complex attacks such as BIM, DeepFool and CW. Even though LID can also
generalize well, our method still outperforms it in most cases. A natural question that arises is
whether the LID can be useful in detecting OOD samples. We indeed compare the performance of
our method with that of LID in the supplementary material, where our method still outperforms LID
in all tested case.
3.3 Class-incremental learning
Setup. For the task of class-incremental learning, we train ResNet with 34 layers for classifying
CIFAR-100 and downsampled ImageNet [4]. As described in Section 2.3, we assume that a classifier
is pre-trained on a certain amount of base classes and new classes with corresponding datasets are
incrementally provided one by one. Specifically, we test two different scenarios: in the first scenario,
half of CIFAR-100 classes are bases classes and the rest are new classes. In the second scenario,
all classes in CIFAR-100 are considered to be base classes and 100 of ImageNet classes are new
classes. All scenarios are tested five times and then averaged. Class splits are randomly generated
for each trial. For comparison, we consider a softmax classifier, which is fine-tuned whenever new
class data come in, and a Euclidean classifier [25], which tries to accommodate a new class by only
computing the class mean. For the softmax classifier, we only update the softmax layer to achieve
near-zero cost training [25], and follow the memory management in Rebuffi & Kolesnikov [29]: a
small number of samples from old classes are kept in the limited memory, where the size of the
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Figure 4: Experimental results of class-incremental learning on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet datasets.
In each experiment, we report (left) AUC with respect to the number of learned classes and, (right)
the base-new class accuracy curve after the last new classes is added.
memory is matched with that for keeping the parameters for Mahalanobis distance-based classifier.
Namely, the number of old exemplars kept for training the softmax classifier is chosen as the sum of
the number of learned classes and the dimension (512 in our experiments) of the hidden features. For
evaluation, similar to [18], we first draw base-new class accuracy curve by adjusting an additional
bias to the new class scores, and measure the area under curve (AUC) since averaging base and new
class accuracy may cause an imbalanced measure of the performance between base and new classes.
Comparison with other classifiers. Figure 4 compares the incremental learning performance of
methods in terms of AUC in the two scenarios mentioned above. In each sub-figure, AUC with re-
spect to the number of learned classes (left) and the base-new class accuracy curve after the last new
classes is added (right) are drawn. Our proposed Mahalanobis distance-based classifier outperforms
the other methods by a significant margin, as the number of new classes increases, although there
is a crossing in the right figure of Figure 4(b) in small regimes (due to the catastrophic forgetting
issue). In particular, the AUC of our proposed method is 40.0% (22.1%), which is better than 32.7%
(15.6%) of the softmax classifier and 32.9% (17.1%) of the Euclidean distance classifier after all
new classes are added in the first (second) experiment. We also report the experimental results in
the supplementary material for the case when classes of CIFAR-100 are base classes and those of
CIFAR-10 are new classes, where the overall trend is similar. The experimental results additionally
demonstrate the superiority of our confidence score, compared to other plausible ones.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a simple yet effective method for detecting abnormal test samples including
both out-of-distribution and adversarial ones. In essence, our main idea is inducing a generative
classifier under LDA assumption, and defining new confidence score based on it. With calibration
techniques such as input pre-processing and feature ensemble, our method performs very strongly
across multiple tasks: detecting out-of-distribution samples, detecting adversarial attacks and class-
incremental learning. We also found that our proposed method is more robust in the choice of its
hyperparameters as well as against extreme scenarios, e.g., when the training dataset has some noisy,
random labels or a small number of data samples. We believe that our approach have a potential to
apply to many other related machine learning tasks, e.g., active learning [8], ensemble learning [19]
and few-shot learning [31].
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Supplementary Material:
A Simple Unified Framework for Detecting Out-of-Distribution
Samples and Adversarial Attacks
A Preliminaries for Gaussian discriminant analysis
In this section, we describe the basic concept of the discriminative and generative classifier [27].
Formally, denote the random variable of the input and label as x ∈ X and y ∈ Y = {1, · · · , C},
respectively. For the classification task, the discriminative classifier directly defines a posterior dis-
tribution P (y|x), i.e., learning a direct mapping between input x and label y. A popular model
for discriminative classifier is softmax classifier which defines the posterior distribution as follows:
P (y = c|x) = exp(w
>
c x+bc)∑
c′ exp(w>c′x+bc′)
, where wc and bc are weights and bias for a class c, respectively.
In contrast to the discriminative classifier, the generative classifier defines the class conditional dis-
tribution P (x|y) and class prior P (y) in order to indirectly define the posterior distribution by
specifying the joint distribution P (x, y) = P (y)P (x|y). Gaussian discriminant analysis (GDA) is
a popular method to define the generative classifier by assuming that the class conditional distribu-
tion follows the multivariate Gaussian distribution and the class prior follows Bernoulli distribution:
P (x|y = c) = N (x|µc,Σc) , P (y = c) = βc∑
c′ βc′
, where µc and Σc are the mean and covariance
of multivariate Gaussian distribution, and βc is the unnormalized prior for class c. This classifier has
been studied in various machine learning areas (e.g., semi-supervised learning [17] and incremental
learning [29]).
In this paper, we focus on the special case of GDA, also known as the linear discriminant analysis
(LDA). In addition to Gaussian assumption, LDA further assumes that all classes share the same
covariance matrix, i.e., Σc = Σ. Since the quadratic term is canceled out with this assumption, the
posterior distribution of generative classifier can be represented as follows:
P (y = c|x) = P (y = c)P (x|y = c)∑
c′ P (y = c
′)P (x|y = c′) =
exp
(
µ>c Σ
−1x− 12µ>c Σ−1µc + log βc
)∑
c′ exp
(
µ>c′Σ−1x− 12µ>c′Σ−1µc′ + log βc′
) .
One can note that the above form of posterior distribution is equivalent to the softmax classifier by
considering µ>c Σ
−1 and − 12µ>c Σ−1µc + log βc as weight and bias of it, respectively. This implies
that x might be fitted in Gaussian distribution during training a softmax classifier.
B Experimental setup
In this section, we describe detailed explanation about all the experiments described in Section 3.
B.1 Experimental setups in detecting out-of-distribution
Detailed model architecture and training. We consider two state-of-the-art neural network archi-
tectures: DenseNet [14] and ResNet [12]. For DenseNet, our model follows the same setup as in
Huang & Liu [14]: 100 layers, growth rate k = 12 and dropout rate 0. Also, we use ResNet with 34
layers and dropout rate 0.2 The softmax classifier is used, and each model is trained by minimizing
the cross-entropy loss using SGD with Nesterov momentum. Specifically, we train DenseNet for
300 epochs with batch size 64 and momentum 0.9. For ResNet, we train it for 200 epochs with
batch size 128 and momentum 0.9. The learning rate starts at 0.1 and is dropped by a factor of 10 at
50% and 75% of the training progress, respectively. The test set errors of DenseNet and ResNet on
CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100 and SVHN are reported in Table 4.
Datasets. We train DenseNet and ResNet for classifying CIFAR-10 (or 100) and SVHN datasets:
the former consists of 50,000 training and 10,000 test images with 10 (or 100) image classes, and
the latter consists of 73,257 training and 26,032 test images with 10 digits.3 The corresponding
2ResNet architecture is available at https://github.com/kuangliu/pytorch-cifar.
3We do not use the extra SVHN dataset for training.
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test dataset is used as the in-distribution (positive) samples to measure the performance. We use
realistic images as the out-of-distribution (negative) samples: the TinyImageNet consists of 10,000
test images with 200 image classes from a subset of ImageNet images. The LSUN consists of 10,000
test images of 10 different scenes. We downsample each image of TinyImageNet and LSUN to size
32× 32.4
Tested methods. In this paper, we consider the baseline method [13] and ODIN [21] for compari-
son. The confidence score in Hendrycks & Gimpel [13] is a maximum value of softmax posterior
distribution, i.e., maxy P (y|x). The key idea of ODIN is the temperature scaling which is defined
as follows:
P (y = ŷ|x;T ) = exp (fŷ(x)/T )∑
y exp (fy(x)/T )
,
where T > 0 is the temperature scaling parameter and f = (f1, . . . , fK) is final feature vector of
deep neural networks. For each data x, ODIN first calculates the pre-processed image x̂ by adding
the small perturbations as follows:
x′ = x− εodinsign (−5x logPθ(y = ŷ|x;T )) ,
where εodin is a magnitude of noise and ŷ is the predicted label. Next, ODIN feeds the
pre-processed data into the classifier, computes the maximum value of scaled predictive dis-
tribution, i.e., maxy Pθ(y|x′;T ), and classifies it as positive (i.e., in-distribution) if the confi-
dence score is above some threshold δ. For ODIN, the perturbation noise εodin is chosen from
{0, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.0014, 0.002, 0.0024, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2}, and the temperature T is cho-
sen from {1, 10, 100, 1000}.
Hyper parameters for our method. There are two hyper parameters in our method: the magnitude
of noise in (4) and layer indexes for feature ensemble. For all experiments, we extract the confidence
scores from every end of dense (or residual) block of DenseNet (or ResNet). The size of feature maps
on each convolutional layers is reduced by average pooling for computational efficiency: F ×H ×
W → F×1, whereF is the number of channels andH×W is the spatial dimension. The magnitude
of noise in (4) is chosen from {0, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.0014, 0.002, 0.0024, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2}.
Performance metrics. For evaluation, we measure the following metrics to measure the effective-
ness of the confidence scores in distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution images.
• True negative rate (TNR) at 95% true positive rate (TPR). Let TP, TN, FP, and FN de-
note true positive, true negative, false positive and false negative, respectively. We measure
TNR = TN / (FP+TN), when TPR = TP / (TP+FN) is 95%.
• Area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUROC). The ROC curve is a
graph plotting TPR against the false positive rate = FP / (FP+TN) by varying a threshold.
• Area under the precision-recall curve (AUPR). The PR curve is a graph plotting the
precision = TP / (TP+FP) against recall = TP / (TP+FN) by varying a threshold. AUPR-IN
(or -OUT) is AUPR where in- (or out-of-) distribution samples are specified as positive.
• Detection accuracy. This metric corresponds to the maximum classification probability
over all possible thresholds δ:
1−min
δ
{
Pin (q (x) ≤ δ)P (x is from Pin) + Pout (q (x) > δ)P (x is from Pout)
}
,
where q(x) is a confident score. We assume that both positive and negative examples have
equal probability of appearing in the test set, i.e., P (x is from Pin) = P (x is from Pout).
Note that AUROC, AUPR and detection accuracy are threshold-independent evaluation metrics.
B.2 Experimental setups in detecting adversarial samples
Adversarial attacks. For the problem of detecting adversarial samples, we consider the following
attack methods: fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [10], basic iterative method (BIM) [16], Deep-
Fool [26] and Carlini-Wagner (CW) [3]. The FGSM directly perturbs normal input in the direction
of the loss gradient. Formally, non-targeted adversarial examples are constructed as
xadv = x + εFGSM sign (5x`(y∗, P (y|x))) ,
4LSUN and TinyImageNet datasets are available at https://github.com/ShiyuLiang/odin-pytorch.
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CIFAR-10 CIFAR-100 SVHN
L∞ Acc. L∞ Acc. L∞ Acc.
DenseNet
Clean 0 95.19% 0 77.63% 0 96.38%
FGSM 0.21 20.04% 0.21 4.86% 0.21 56.27%
BIM 0.22 0.00% 0.22 0.02% 0.22 0.67%
DeepFool 0.30 0.23% 0.25 0.23% 0.57 0.50%
CW 0.05 0.10% 0.03 0.16% 0.12 0.54%
ResNet
Clean 0 93.67% 0 78.34% 0 96.68%
FGSM 0.25 23.98% 0.25 11.67% 0.25 49.33%
BIM 0.26 0.02% 0.26 0.21% 0.26 2.37%
DeepFool 0.36 0.33% 0.27 0.37% 0.62 13.20%
CW 0.08 0.00% 0.08 0.01% 0.15 0.04%
Table 4: The L∞ mean perturbation and classification accuracy on clean and adversarial samples.
where εFGSM is a magnitude of noise, y∗ is the ground truth label and ` is a loss function to measure
the distance between the prediction and the ground truth. The BIM is an iterative version of FGSM,
which applies FGSM multiple times with a smaller step size. Formally, non-targeted adversarial
examples are constructed as
x0adv = x, x
n+1
adv = Clip
εBIM
x {xnadv + αBIM sign
(5xnadv`(y∗, P (y|xnadv)))},
where ClipεBIMx means we clip the resulting image to be within the εBIM -ball of x. DeepFool works
by finding the closest adversarial examples with geometric formulas. CW is an optimization-based
method which arguably the most effective method. Formally, non-targeted adversarial examples are
constructed as
arg min
xadv
λd(x,xadv)− `(y∗, P (y|xadv)),
where λ is penalty parameter and d(·, ·) is a metric to quantify the distance between an original
image and its adversarial counterpart. However, compared to FGSM and BIM, this method is much
slower in practice. For all experiments, L2 distance is used as a constraint. We used the library from
FaceBook [11] for generating adversarial samples.5 Table 4 tatistics of adversarial attacks including
the L∞ mean perturbation and classification accuracy on adversarial attacks.
Tested methods. Ma et al. [22] proposed to characterize adversarial subspaces by using local in-
trinsic dimensionality (LID). Given a test sample x, LID is defined as follows:
L̂ID = −
(
1
k
∑
i
log
ri(x)
rk(x)
)
,
where ri(x) denotes the distance between x and its i-th nearest neighbor within a sample of points
drawn from in-distribution, and rk(x) denotes the maximum distance among k nearest neighbors.
We commonly extract the LID scores from every end of dense (or residual) block of DenseNet (or
ResNet) similar to ours. Given test sample x and the set Xc of training samples with label c, the
Gaussian kernel density with bandwidth σ is defined as follows:
KD(x) =
1
|Xc|
∑
xi∈Xc
kσ(xi,x),
where kσ(x, y) ∝ exp(−||x− y||2/σ2). For LID and KD, we used the library from Ma et al. [22].
Hyper-parameters and training. Following the similar strategies in [7, 22], we randomly choose
10% of original test samples for training the logistic regression detectors and the remaining test
samples are used for evaluation. The training sets consists of three types of examples: adversarial,
normal and noisy. Here, noisy examples are generated by adding random noise to normal examples.
Using nested cross validation within the training set, all hyper-parameters including the bandwidth
5The code is available at https://github.com/facebookresearch/adversarial_image_defenses.
14
Mahalanobis (our)LID
60
70
80
90
100
5K 10K 20K 30K 40K 50K
Adversarial attack: FGSM
60
70
80
90
100
5K 10K 20K 30K 40K 50K
Adversarial attack: BIM
60
70
80
90
100
5K 10K 20K 30K 40K 50K
Adversarial attack: DeepFool
60
70
80
90
100
5K 10K 20K 30K 40K 50K
Adversarial attack: CW
(a) Small training data: the x-axis represents the number of training data
60
70
80
90
100
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Adversarial attack: FGSM
60
70
80
90
100
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Adversarial attack: BIM
60
70
80
90
100
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Adversarial attack: DeepFool
60
70
80
90
100
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
Adversarial attack: CW
(b) Noisy training data: the x-axis represents the percentage of training data with random label
Figure 5: Comparison of AUROC (%) under different training data. To evaluate the robustness of
proposed method, we train ResNet (a) by varying the number of training data and (b) assigning
random label to training data on CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Figure 6: Experimental results of class-incremental learning on CIFAR-100 and CIFAR-10 datasets.
We report (left) AUC with respect to the number of learned classes and, (right) the base-new class
accuracy curve after the last new classes is added.
parameter for KD, the number of nearest neighbors for LID, and input noise for our method are
tuned. Specifically, the value of k is chosen from {10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90} with respect to
a minibatch of size 100, and the bandwidth was chosen from {0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. The magnitude
of noise in (4) is chosen from {0, 0.0005, 0.001, 0.0014, 0.002, 0.0024, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2}.
C More experimental results
In this section, we provide more experimental results.
C.1 Robustness of our method in detecting adversarial samples
In order to verify the robustness, we measure the detection performance when we train ResNet
by varying the number of training data and assigning random label to training data on CIFAR-10
dataset. As shown in Figure 5, our method (blue bar) outperforms LID (green bar) for all experi-
ments.
C.2 Class-incremental learning
Figure 6 compares the AUCs of tested methods when CIFAR-100 is pre-trained and CIFAR-10 is
used as new classes. Our proposed Mahalanobis distance-based classifier outperforms the other
methods by a significant margin, as the number of new classes increases. The AUC of our proposed
method is 47.7%, which is better than 41.0% of the softmax classifier and 43.0% of the Euclidean
distance classifier after all new classes are added.
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C.3 Experimental results on joint confidence loss
In addition, we remark that the proposed detector using softmax neural classifier trained by standard
cross entropy loss typically outperforms the ODIN detector using softmax neural classifier trained
by confidence loss [19] which involves jointly training a generator and a classifier to calibrate the
posterior distribution. Also, our detector provides further improvement if one use it with model
trained by confidence loss. In other words, our proposed method can improve any pre-trained soft-
max neural classifier.
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Figure 7: Performances of the baseline detector [13], ODIN detector [21] and Mahalanobis detector
under various training losses.
C.4 Comparison with ODIN
In-dist
(model) Out-of-dist
TNR at TPR 95% AUROC Detection accuracy AUPR in AUPR out
Baseline [13] / ODIN [21] / Mahalanobis (ours)
CIFAR-10
(DenseNet)
SVHN 40.2 / 86.2 / 90.8 89.9 / 95.5 / 98.1 83.2 / 91.4 / 93.9 83.1 / 78.8 / 96.6 94.7 / 98.3 / 99.2
TinyImageNet 58.9 / 92.4 / 95.0 94.1 / 98.5 / 98.8 88.5 / 93.9 / 95.0 95.3 / 98.5 / 98.8 92.3 / 98.5 / 98.8
LSUN 66.6 / 96.2 / 97.2 95.4 / 99.2 / 99.3 90.3 / 95.7 / 96.3 96.5 / 99.3 / 99.3 94.1 / 99.2 / 99.1
CIFAR-100
(DenseNet)
SVHN 26.7 / 70.6 / 82.5 82.7 / 93.8 / 97.2 75.6 / 86.6 / 91.5 74.3 / 87.1 / 94.8 91.0 / 97.3 / 98.8
TinyImageNet 17.6 / 42.6 / 86.6 71.7 / 85.2 / 97.4 65.7 / 77.0 / 92.2 74.2 / 85.6 / 97.6 69.0 / 84.5 / 97.2
LSUN 16.7 / 41.2 / 91.4 70.8 / 85.5 / 98.0 64.9 / 77.1 / 93.9 74.1 / 86.4 / 98.2 67.9 / 84.2 / 97.5
SVHN
(DenseNet)
CIFAR-10 69.3 / 71.7 / 96.8 91.9 / 91.4 / 98.9 86.6 / 85.8 / 95.9 95.7 / 95.2 / 99.6 82.8 / 84.5 / 95.8
TinyImageNet 79.8 / 84.1 / 99.9 94.8 / 95.1 / 99.9 90.2 / 90.4 / 98.9 97.2 / 97.1 / 99.9 88.4 / 91.4 / 99.6
LSUN 77.1 / 81.1 / 100.0 94.1 / 94.5 / 99.9 89.1 / 89.2 / 99.3 97.0 / 97.0 / 99.9 87.4 / 90.5 / 99.7
CIFAR-10
(ResNet)
SVHN 32.5 / 86.6 / 96.4 89.9 / 96.7 / 99.1 85.1 / 91.1 / 95.8 85.4 / 92.5 / 98.3 94.0 / 98.5 / 99.6
TinyImageNet 44.7 / 72.5 / 97.1 91.0 / 94.0 / 99.5 85.1 / 86.5 / 96.3 92.5 / 94.2 / 99.5 88.4 / 94.1 / 99.5
LSUN 45.4 / 73.8 / 98.9 91.0 / 94.1 / 99.7 85.3 / 86.7 / 97.7 92.5 / 94.2 / 99.7 88.6 / 94.3 / 99.7
CIFAR-100
(ResNet)
SVHN 20.3 / 62.7 / 91.9 79.5 / 93.9 / 98.4 73.2 / 88.0 / 93.7 64.8 / 89.0 / 96.4 89.0 / 96.9 / 99.3
TinyImageNet 20.4 / 49.2 / 90.9 77.2 / 87.6 / 98.2 70.8 / 80.1 / 93.3 79.7 / 87.1 / 98.2 73.3 / 87.4 / 98.2
LSUN 18.8 / 45.6 / 90.9 75.8 / 85.6 / 98.2 69.9 / 78.3 / 93.5 77.6 / 84.5 / 98.4 72.0 / 85.7 / 97.8
SVHN
(ResNet)
CIFAR-10 78.3 / 79.8 / 98.4 92.9 / 92.1 / 99.3 90.0 / 89.4 / 96.9 95.1 / 94.0 / 99.7 85.7 / 86.8 / 97.0
TinyImageNet 79.0 / 82.1 / 99.9 93.5 / 92.0 / 99.9 90.4 / 89.4 / 99.1 95.7 / 93.9 / 99.9 86.2 / 88.1 / 99.1
LSUN 74.3 / 77.3 / 99.9 91.6 / 89.4 / 99.9 89.0 / 87.2 / 99.5 94.2 / 92.1 / 99.9 84.0 / 85.5 / 99.1
Table 5: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification. We tune the
hyper-parameters using validation set of in- and out-of-distributions. All values are percentages and
the best results are indicated in bold.
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In-dist
(model) Out-of-dist
TNR at TPR 95% AUROC Detection accuracy AUPR in AUPR out
Baseline [13] / ODIN [21] / Mahalanobis (ours)
CIFAR-10
(DenseNet)
SVHN 40.2 / 70.5 / 89.6 89.9 / 92.8 / 97.6 83.2 / 86.5 / 92.6 83.1 / 72.1 / 94.5 94.7 / 97.4 / 99.0
TinyImageNet 58.9 / 87.1 / 94.9 94.1 / 97.2 / 98.8 88.5 / 92.1 / 95.0 95.3 / 94.7 / 98.7 92.3 / 97.0 / 98.8
LSUN 66.6 / 92.9 / 97.2 95.4 / 98.5 / 99.2 90.3 / 94.3 / 96.2 96.5 / 97.7 / 99.3 94.1 / 98.2 / 99.2
CIFAR-100
(DenseNet)
SVHN 26.7 / 39.8 / 62.2 82.7 / 88.2 / 91.8 75.6 / 80.7 / 84.6 74.3 / 80.8 / 82.6 91.0 / 94.0 / 95.8
TinyImageNet 17.6 / 43.2 / 87.2 71.7 / 85.3 / 97.0 65.7 / 77.2 / 91.8 74.2 / 85.8 / 96.2 69.0 / 84.7 / 97.1
LSUN 16.7 / 42.1 / 91.4 70.8 / 85.7 / 97.9 64.9 / 77.3 / 93.8 74.1 / 86.7 / 98.1 67.9 / 84.6 / 97.6
SVHN
(DenseNet)
CIFAR-10 69.3 / 69.3 / 97.5 91.9 / 91.9 / 98.8 86.6 / 86.6 / 96.3 95.7 / 95.7 / 99.6 82.8 / 82.8 / 95.1
TinyImageNet 79.8 / 79.8 / 99.9 94.8 / 94.8 / 99.8 90.2 / 90.2 / 98.9 97.2 / 97.2 / 99.9 88.4 / 88.4 / 99.5
LSUN 77.1 / 77.1 / 100 94.1 / 94.1 / 99.9 89.1 / 89.1 / 99.2 97.0 / 97.0 / 99.9 87.4 / 87.4 / 99.6
CIFAR-10
(ResNet)
SVHN 32.5 / 40.3 / 75.8 89.9 / 86.5 / 95.5 85.1 / 77.8 / 89.1 85.4 / 77.8 / 91.0 94.0 / 93.7 / 98.0
TinyImageNet 44.7 / 69.6 / 95.5 91.0 / 93.9 / 99.0 85.1 / 86.0 / 95.4 92.5 / 94.3 / 98.6 88.4 / 93.7 / 99.1
LSUN 45.4 / 70.0 / 98.1 91.0 / 93.7 / 99.5 85.3 / 85.8 / 97.2 92.5 / 94.1 / 99.5 88.6 / 93.6 / 99.5
CIFAR-100
(ResNet)
SVHN 20.3 / 12.2 / 41.9 79.5 / 72.0 / 84.4 73.2 / 67.7 / 76.5 64.8 / 48.6 / 69.1 89.0 / 84.9 / 92.7
TinyImageNet 20.4 / 33.5 / 70.3 77.2 / 83.6 / 87.9 70.8 / 75.9 / 84.6 79.7 / 84.5 / 76.8 73.3 / 81.7 / 90.7
LSUN 18.8 / 31.6 / 56.6 75.8 / 81.9 / 82.3 69.9 / 74.6 / 79.7 77.6 / 82.1 / 70.3 72.0 / 80.3 / 85.3
SVHN
(ResNet)
CIFAR-10 78.3 / 79.8 / 94.1 92.9 / 92.1 / 97.6 90.0 / 89.4 / 94.6 95.1 / 94.0 / 98.1 85.7 / 86.8 / 94.7
TinyImageNet 79.0 / 80.5 / 99.2 93.5 / 92.9 / 99.3 90.4 / 90.1 / 98.8 95.7 / 94.8 / 98.8 86.2 / 87.5 / 98.3
LSUN 74.3 / 76.3 / 99.9 91.6 / 90.7 / 99.9 89.0 / 88.2 / 99.5 94.2 / 93.0 / 99.9 84.0 / 85.0 / 98.8
Table 6: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification when we tune
the hyper-parameters of ODIN and our method only using in-distribution and adversarial (FGSM)
samples. All values are percentages and boldface values indicate relative the better results.
C.5 LID for detecting out-of-distribution samples
Figure 8 and 9 shows the performance of the ODIN [21], LID [22] and Mahalanobis detector for
each in- and out-of-distribution pair. We remark that the proposed method outperforms all tested
methods.
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Figure 8: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification using
ResNet.
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Figure 9: Distinguishing in- and out-of-distribution test set data for image classification using
DenseNet.
D Evaluation on ImageNet dataset
In this section, we verify the performance of the proposed method using the ImageNet 2012 clas-
sification dataset [5] that consists of 1000 classes. The models are trained on the 1.28 million
training images, and evaluated on the 50k validation images. For all experiments, we use the
pre-trained ResNet [12] which is available at https://github.com/pytorch/vision/blob/
master/torchvision/models/resnet.py. First, we measure the classification accuracy of gen-
erative classifier from the pre-trained model as follows:
ŷ(x) = arg min
c
(f(x)− µ̂c)> Σ̂−1 (f(x)− µ̂c) + log β̂c,
where β̂c = NcN is an empirical class prior. We remark that this corresponds to predicting a class
label using the posterior distribution from generative with LDA assumption. Table 7 shows the
top-1 classification accuracy on ImageNet 2012 dataset. One can note that the proposed generative
classifier can perform reasonably well even though the softmax classifier outperforms it in all cases.
However, we remark that the gap between them is decreasing as the training accuracy increases, i.e.,
the pre-trained model learned more strong representations.
Model Softmax (training) Softmax (validation) Generative (validation)
ResNet (101 layers) 86.55 75.66 73.49
ResNet (18 layers) 69.06 68.69 63.32
Table 7: Top-1 accuracy (%) of ResNets on ImageNet 2012 dataset.
Next, we also evaluate the detection performance of the Mahalanobis distance-based detector on
ImageNet 2012 dataset using ResNets with 18 layers. For evaluation, we consider the problem of
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Figure 10: (a)/(b) Distinguishing clean and adversarial samples using ResNet with 18 layers on
ImageNet 2012 validation set. (c)/(d) Distinguishing clean and garbage samples using ResNet 18
layers trained on CIFAR-10 dataset.
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Figure 11: The generated garbage sample and its target class.
detecting adversarial samples generated by FGSM [10] and BIM [16]. Similar to Section 3.2, we
extract the confidence scores from every end of residual block of ResNet. Figure 10(a) and 10(b)
show the performance of various detectors. One can note that the proposed Mahalanobis distance-
based detector outperforms all tested methods including LID. These results imply that our method
can be working well for the large-scale datasets.
E Adaptive attacks against Mahalanobis distance-based detector
In this section, we evaluate the robustness of our method by generating the garbage images which
may fool the Mahalanobis distance-based detector in a white-box setting, i.e., one can access to the
parameters of the classifier and that of the Mahalanobis distance-based detector. Here, we remark
that accessing the parameters of the Mahalanobis distance-based detector, i.e., sample means and
covariance, is not mild assumption since the information about training data is required to compute
them. To attack our method, we generate a garbage images xg by minimizing the Mahalanobis
distance as follows:
arg min
xg
(f(xg)− µ̂c)> Σ̂−1 (f(xg)− µ̂c) ,
where c is a target class. We test two different scenarios using ResNet with 34 layers trained on
CIFAR-10 dataset. In the first scenario, we generate the garbage images only using a penultimate
layer of DNNs. In the second scenario, we attack every end of residual block of ResNet. Figure 11
shows the generated samples by minimizing the Mahalanobis distance. Even though the generated
sample looks like the random noise, it successfully fools the pre-trained classifier, i.e., it is classified
as the target class. We measure the detection performance of the baseline [13], ODIN [21], LID
[22] and the proposed Mahalanobis distance-based detector. As shown in Figure 10(c) and 10(d),
our method can distinguish CIFAR-10 test and garbage images for both scenarios better than the
tested methods. In particular, we remark that the input pre-processing is very useful in detecting
such garbage samples. These results imply that our proposed method is robust to the attacks.
F Hybrid inference of generative and discriminative classifiers
In this paper, we show that the generative classifier can be very useful in characterizing the abnormal
samples such as OOD and adversarial samples. Here, a caveat is that the generative classifier might
degrade the classification performance. In order to handle this issue, we introduce a hybrid inference
of generative and discriminative classifiers. Given a generative classifier with GDA assumptions, the
posterior distribution of generative classifier via Bayes rule is given as:
P (y = c|x) = P (y = c)P (x|y = c)∑
c′ P (y = c
′)P (x|y = c′) =
exp
(
µ>c Σ
−1x− 12µ>c Σ−1µc + log βc
)∑
c′ exp
(
µ>c′Σ−1x− 12µ>c′Σ−1µc′ + log βc′
) .
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To match this with a standard softmax classifier’s weights, the parameters of the generative classifier
have to satisfy the following conditions:
µc = Σwc, log βc − 0.5µ>c Σ−1µc = bc,
where wc and bc are weights and bias for a class c, respectively. Using the empirical covariance
Σ̂ as shown in (1), one can induce the parameters of another generative classifier which has same
decision boundary with the softmax classifier as follows:
µ˜c = Σ̂wc, β˜c =
exp(0.5µ˜>c Σ̂
−1µ˜c − bc)∑
c′ exp(0.5µ˜
>
c′Σ̂
−1µ˜c′ − bc′)
.
Here, we normalize the β˜c to satisfy
∑
c β˜c = 1. Then, using this generative classifier, we define new
hybrid posterior distribution which combines the softmax- and sample-based generative classifiers:
Ph(y|x)
=
exp
(
λ
(
µ̂>c Σ̂
−1x− 0.5µ̂>c Σ̂−1µ̂c + log β̂c
)
+ (1− λ)
(
µ˜>c Σ̂
−1x− 0.5µ˜>c Σ̂−1µ˜c + log β˜c
))
∑
c′ exp
(
λ
(
µ̂>c′Σ̂−1x− 0.5µ̂>c′Σ̂−1µ̂c′ + log β̂c′
)
+ (1− λ)
(
µ˜>c′Σ̂−1x− 0.5µ˜>c′Σ̂−1µ˜c′ + log β˜c′
)) ,
where λ ∈ [0, 1] is a hyper-parameter. This hybrid model can be interpreted as ensemble of softmax
and generative classifiers, and one can expect that it can improve the classification performance.
Table 8 compares the classification accuracy of softmax, generative and hybrid classifiers. One can
note that the hybrid model improves the classification accuracy, where we determine the optimal
tuning parameter between the two objectives using the validation set. We also remark that such
hybrid model can be useful in detecting the abnormal samples, where we pursue these tasks in the
future.
Model Dataset Softmax Generative Hybrid
DenseNet
CIFAR-10 95.16 94.76 95.00
CIFAR-100 77.64 74.01 77.71
SVHN 96.42 96.32 96.34
ResNet
CIFAR-10 93.61 94.13 94.11
CIFAR-100 78.08 77.86 77.96
SVHN 96.62 96.58 96.59
Table 8: Classification test set accuracy (%) of DenseNet and ResNet on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100
and SVHN datasets.
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